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In this paper we generalize Berge’s Maximum Theorem to the case where the 
payoff (utility) functions and the feasible action correspondences are not lower 
semicontinuous. The condition we introduced is called the Feasible Path Transfer 
Lower Semicontinuity (in short, FPT I.s.c.). By applying our Maximum Theorem to 
game theory and economics, we are able to prove the existence of equilibrium for 
the generalized games (the so-called abstract economics) and Nash equilibrium for 
games where the payoff functions and the feasible strategy correspondences are not 
lower semicontinuous. Thus the existence theorems given in this paper generalize 
many existence theorems on Nash equilibrium and equilibrium for the generalized 
games in the literature. 0 1992 Academic Press, Inc. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The “Maximum Theorem” is one of the most useful and powerful 
theorems in economics, optimization, and game theory. It states that the 
set of solutions to a maximization problem varies upper semicontinuously 
as the constraint set of the problem varies in a continuous way. The 
theorem, first stated and proved by Claude Berge [3; 4, p. 1161, is 
essentially as follows: 
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LEMMA 1 (Berge [4, p. 1161). Let E and Y be topological spaces. If 
(i) u: E x Y + R! is a continuous real-valued function; 
(ii) F: E + 2’ is continuous and compact-valued correspondence, 
then the correspondence M: E + 2’ defined, for each e E E, as 
M(e)={yEF(e):u(e,y)>u(e,x),VxEF(e)} (1) 
is upper semicontinuous and compact-valued, and the real-valued function 
$ : E + R defined, ,for each e E E, as 
is continuous. 
$(e)=max{u(e,y):yEF(e)} (2) 
In applications, following Walker’s [25] terminologies, E is generally 
interpreted to be a set of environments, Y a set of actions that might be 
undertaken, u a payoff (utility) function, F(e) the set of feasible actions 
available in environment e, and M(e) the set of optimal actions in environ- 
ment e. Then the Maximum Theorem gives conditions under which the 
function $(e) (called marginal (or performance, value) function) is 
continuous and the “maximizing correspondence” M(e) is upper semi- 
continuous and thus the limit of optimal actions is also an optimal action. 
Besides its own importance in the decision situation, the Maximum 
Theorem can also be used together with other theorems to prove the exist- 
ence of Nash equilibrium and equilibrium for the generalized game which 
was first defined by Debreu [S].’ The hypotheses in the classical existence 
theorems of Nash equilibrium and equilibrium for the generalized games of 
these types (e.g., in [17, 18, 8, 12, 11, 191) typically assumed continuity for 
both the payoff functions and the feasible strategy correspondences, and 
quasiconcavity for the payoff functions (in addition to the usual convexity 
and compactness assumptions on the values of the feasible strategy corre- 
spondences). It is known that in many important economic games the 
payoff functions and the feasible strategy correspondences are discon- 
tinuous (see Dasgupta and Maskin [7] and the references therein). On the 
other hand, then non-existence of Nash equilibrium in simple economic 
models was noted a long time ago by Edgeworth [9] in his critique of 
Bertrand’s [S] analysis of the price setting duopolists. To better under- 
stand why a model does or does not possess an equilibrium, it is helpful to 
analyze its behavior and identify the failure-violation of quasiconcavity or 
of continuity which causes non-existence of equilibrium. In Baye, Tian, and 
’ The generalized game is also called the abstract economy or the social equilibrium in the 
economics literature. 
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Zhou [Z], the authors exposed that the failure of quasiconcavity of the 
payoff functions is not responsible for the non-existence of equilibrium and 
gave a condition which is weaker than the quasiconcavity.* 
In this paper we focus on analyzing the behavior of games where the 
payoff functions and the feasible strategy correspondences are not lower 
semicontinuous and on detecting some attributes of the non-existence of 
Nash equilibrium and equilibrium for the generalized games. We then give 
weakened conditions that guarantee the existence of Nash equilibrium and 
equilibrium for (generalized) games. We do so by introducing a weaker 
condition which is called the Feasible Path Transfer Lower Semicontinuity 
(in short, FPT 1.s.c.). With this condition, we generalize Berge’s Maximum 
Theorem to the case where the payoff functions and the feasible action 
correspondences are not lower semicontinuous. By applying our Maximum 
Theorem to game theory and economics, we are able to prove the existence 
of equilibrium for the generalized games and Nash equilibrium for games. 
Thus the existence theorems given in this paper generalize many existence 
theorems on Nash equilibrium and equilibrium for the generalized games 
in the literature. 
2. NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS 
Let X be a subset of a topological space. For each XE X, denote a 
neighborhood of x E X by X(x). 
A function U: X+ R is said to be upper semicontinuous if for each point 
x’ E X, we have 
lim sup U(X) < 24(x’), 
I + .x’ 
or equivalently, its epigraph ep u = {(x, a) EXX R: u(x) 3 a> is a closed 
subset of Xx R. 
A function u: X+ R! is said to be lower semicontinuous if -u(x) is upper 
semicontinuous. 
Let X and Y be two topological spaces, and let 2’ be the collection of 
all subsets of Y. 
A correspondence F: X -+ 2’ is said to be upper semicontinuous (in short, 
u.s.c.) if the set 
{xEX: F(x)c V} 
is open for every open set V of Y. 
* The condition which is called the O-generalized quasiconcavity is not only necessary but 
also, under some regular topological conditions, sullicient for the existence of Nash 
equilibrium. 
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A correspondence F: X + 2’ is said to be lower semicontinuous (in short, 
1.s.c.) if the set 
{xEX: F(x)n I’#@) 
is open for every open set V of Y. 
A correspondence F: X+ 2” is said to be continuous if it is both U.S.C. 
and 1.s.c. 
A correspondence F: X + 2 ’ is said to be closed (open) if its graph is 
closed (open). 
3. THE FEASIBLE PATH TRANSFER LOWER SEMICONTINUITY 
AND THE MAXIMUM THEOREM 
Let us assume all the conditions in Lemma 1 hold except the lower semi- 
continuities of u and F, then examine the behavior of the correspondence 
M(e) defined in Lemma 1. We first state the following lemma. 
LEMMA 2 (Berge [4, p. 1121). Let E and Y be two topological spaces, let 
G: E + 2’ and F: E -+ 2’ be correspondences; if 
(i) G is closed, and 
(ii) F is U.S.C. and compact-valued, 
then G n F is U.S.C. and compact-valued. 
Since M(e) = M(e) n F(e) and F is assumed to be U.S.C. and compact- 
valued, to prove that M is u.s.c., in view of Lemma 2, we only need to show 
that M is closed. 
For easy understanding, we temporarily assume that E and F are 
normed spaces. Then we want to know what the geometric behavior of 
M(e) is when en -+ e, y” --f y, and y” E M(e”). Since F is U.S.C. and compact- 
valued, it is closed. Therefore e” + e, y” + y, and y” E F(e”) will imply that 
y E F(e). When u is U.S.C. and y 4 M(e), they imply respectively that 
(i) VE > 0 as n is sufftciently large 
de, y) Z de”, y”) - E; 
(ii) 3z E F(e), such that 
u(e, z) > 46 y). 
But y” maximizes u(e”, ) on F(e”). Therefore by (i) and (ii), it follows that 
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(iii) 3s’> 0 such that for n sufficiently large 
u(e, z) a u(e”, y’) + E’, Vy’ E F( e”). 
If we see the point (e, z, u(e, z)) through (e”, F(e”), u(e”, F(e”))ta part of 
the graph of U, like a tunnel, we can see that u has an upper jump at (e, z). 
If F(e) is l.s.c., we can find a path y” E F(e”) such that (e”, y”) -+ (e, z), If u 
is 1.s.c. along this path, then the upper jump of u at (e, z) will not happen. 
If F(e) is not I.s.c., a path j”~F(e”) with (e”, j”) + (e, Z) may not exist. 
However, if there is a path j7” E F(e”) (not necessarily ” + z) and after we 
transfer (e, z) to (e”, y”), then 
u(e, z) d lim inf u(e”, L;“), 
n + cc 
and thus the upper jump of u at (e, z) can also be avoided. This geometric 
observation leads us to 
DEFINITION 1. Let E and Y be two topological spaces and F: E .+ 2’ be 
a correspondence. 
A function u(e, y): E x Y -+ R is said to be Feasible Path Transfer Lower 
Semicontinuous (in short, FPT 1.s.c.) in e with respect to F if for each 
(e, y) E E x Y with y E F(e), there exists some neighborhood N(e) of e such 
that Ve’ E N(e), 3y’ E F(e’) (a feasible path) satisfying 
u(e, y) < lim inf u(e’, y’), 
<“de 
or, equivalently, for each (e, y)~ E x Y with YE F(e) and Ve>O, &V(e) 
such that Ve’EN(e), 3 (a feasible path) y’~ F(e’) satisfying 
u(e, y) < u(e’, y’) + 8. 
Remark 1. Observe that 
(i) A feasible path always exists although it may have no limit. In 
the definition, there is no need to assume that a feasible path has a limit. 
(ii) If F is I.s.c., then a feasible path y’ + y is always available. 
We can use the FPT 1.s.c. to generalize Theorem 6.3.1 in Berge 
[4, p. 1151 or Theorem 2.5.2 in Aubin [ 1, p. 691 to the following proposi- 
tion which will be used to prove our Maximum theorem. Let E and Y be 
two topological spaces, F: E + 2’ be a nonempty-valued correspondence, 
and U: E x Y + R be a real-valued function. When we consider the family 
of maximization problems 
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that depend on the parameter e, by the stability of this family of optimiza- 
tion problems, we usually mean the study of various continuity properties 
of the marginal (or performance, value) function $(e) and the maximum 
correspondence 
M(e) = {ye F(e): u(e, y) = t)(e)}. 
The following proposition characterizes the I.s.c. of the marginal function. 
It has also potential applications in quasi-variational inequalities, 
PROPOSITION 1. Let E und Y he two topological spaces, F: E -+ 2’ he a 
nonempty-valued correspondence, and u : E x Y + R be a real-valued function. 
Then the marginal function $1 E + Iw defined, for each e E E, as 
is 1,s.~. if and only if u(e,y) is FPT1.s.c. in e w1.r.t. F. 
Proof: When the marginal function Ii/(e) is 1,s.~. V(e, y)~ E x Y with 
y E F(e), V’E > 0, 3M(e) such that Ve’ E J(e) 
the) < $(e’) + 6. 
Then for every such e’, by the definition of e(e), 3~’ E F(e’) such that 
u(e, y) d $(e) < u(e’, y’) + E. 
Therefore u(e, y) is FPT I.s.c. in e w.r.t. F. 
On the other hand, when u(e, y) is FPT 1.s.c. in e w.r.t. F, to show that 
$ is 1.s.c. is equivalent to showing that for each UE R, the set 
is closed. 
If e $ P, then sup{ u(e, y): y E F(e)} > a and thus 3y E F(e) such that 
de, Y) > a. 
Since u(e, y) is FPT 1.s.c. in e w.r.t. F, for F = u(e, y)-a>O, IN(e) such 
that Ve’ E M(e), 3~’ E F(e’) satisfying 
46 Y) < u(e’, Y’) + E, 
or 
u(e’, y’) > a. 
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Therefore 
and P is closed. Q.E.D. 
The following theorem is our main result in this paper which generalizes 
the Maximum theorem of Berge [3, 41 by relaxing lower semicontinuity. 
THEOREM 1. Let E and Y be two topological spaces. If 
(i) u : E x Y + R is a U.S.C. real-valued function ; 
(ii) F: E+2Y is a nonempty compact-valued and closed corre- 
spondence ;
(iii) u(e, y) is FPT kc. in e w.r.t. F, 
then the maximum correspondence M: E + 2’ defined, for each e E E, as 
M(e)={yEF(e):u(e,y)>u(e,x),VxEF(e)j 
is nonempty compact-valued and closed and the marginal function $ : E + R 
defined, for each e E E, as 
is I.s.c. If, in addition, F is u.s.c., then A4 is U.S.C. and $ is continuous. 
Proof: M(e) is nonempty compact-valued as F(e) is nonempty 
compact-valued and u is U.S.C. 
We show that M is closed, i.e., the graph of A4 
Graph(M) = {(e, y) E E x Y: y E M(e)} 
is closed. Thus, we have to show that, if (e, y) 6 Graph(M), there exist 
N’(e) and N’(y) such that 
N’(e) x JV’( y) n Graph(M) = 0. 
Indeed, if (e, y) $ Graph(M), i.e., y $ M(e), then either y q! F(e) or y E F(e) 
but there exists z E F(e) such that u(e, z) > u(e, y). In the case of y 4 F(e), 
since F is closed (i.e., its graph is closed), there exists a neighborhood 
N(e, y) of (e, y) such that 
&“(e, y) n Graph(F) = 0, 
In the case where ye F(e) but there exists ZE F(e) such that u(e, z) > 
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u(e, y), since u is FPT 1,s.~. in e at (e, z) with z gF(e), there exist E > 0 and 
M(e) such that Ve’ E .,V”(e), 3z’ E F(e’) satisfying 
u(e, y) < u(e, z) - E < u(e’, 2’) < u(e’, y’), Vy’ E M( e’ ). (3) 
Now we claim that there exist h”(e) c Jr(e) and J”(y) such that 
N’(y) n M(e’) = 0, Ve’ e M’(e). 
Suppose not. Then, for any M’(e) c -;t-(e) and M’(y), 3e’ E ,/$“‘(e) c JV(e) 
and y’ E JV’( y) such that y’ E JV’( y) n M(e’). Thus by (3), 
u(e, y) < u(e, z) -E < u(e’, y’) (4) 
or 
u(e,y)<u(e,z)-s< limsup u(e’,y’), 
(c’. r’) - CL’. -1.1 
which implies that u is not U.S.C. at (e, y), a contradiction. Therefore 
,V’(e) x M’(y) n Graph(M) = 0, 
and thus M is closed. By Proposition 1, II/ is 1.~. 
Now if, in addition, F is u.s.c., since M(e) = M(e) n F(e) and F is 
compact-valued, then M is U.S.C. by Lemma 2. Also, since u is U.S.C. 
and F is U.S.C. and compact-valued, $ is U.S.C. by Theorem 7.3.2 of Berge 
[4, p. 1161 and thus it is continuous. Q.E.D. 
As a further application of Proposition 1, let us prove a proposition 
which is a generalization of several theorems in quasi-variational 
inequalities (e.g., Theorem 1 in Shih and Tan [21] and also see Yen [ZS]) 
by relaxing the conditions on T. By Proposition 1, we can see that the 
condition we give on T is a necessary and sufficient condition that the 
function sup, t TCvj (24, x - y ) is 1s.~. in x. 
PROPOSITION 2. Let X he a compact convex subset of a locally convex 
topological vector space E with its dual E’. Suppose that 
(i) F: X + 2x is a U.S.C. correspondence with nonempty closed convex 
values, 
(ii) T: X + 2E’ is a correspondence with nonempty values such that for 
each fixed y E X, the function (u, x-y) : E’ x X + [w is FPT 1.s.c. in x 
w.r.t. T, 
(iii) the set {xEX: ~up,~~~.~)sup~~~,,.)(u, x-y) GO> is closed. 
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Then there exists i E X such that 
iEF(i) 
sup (u,?-y)<O vy E F(i). 
ut T(4) 
ProoJ: Define a function 4: Xx X-+ R u { km} by 
d(x,y)= sup (u,x-y4'. 
UE T(r) 
Then, by Proposition 1, we know that 4 is 1s.~. in x. Thus, by 
Theorem 9.3.1 in Aubin[ l] or Theorem 3.1 in Zhou and Chen [29], there 
exists i E X such that 
iEF(i) 
sup (u,i-y)<O vy E F(2). 
UE 7-l) 
The proof is completed. Q.E.D. 
4. EQUILIBRIUM FOR THE GENERALIZED GAMES 
Let I be the set of agents which is any countable or uncountable set. 
Each agent i chooses a strategy xi in a set Xi of a locally convex topologi- 
cal vector space. Denote by X the (Cartesian) product n,EIXj and X-, the 
product n. ,e,,ii)Xj. Denote by x and xpi an element of X and Xmi. Each 
agent i has a payoff (utility) function ui: X+ R. Given xei (the strategies 
of others), the choice of the ith agent is restricted to a nonempty, convex 
and compact set Fi(xp,)cXi, the feasible strategy set; the ith agent 
choose xi~Fi(xpj) so as to maximize ui(xpi,xi) over Fi(xp,). 
DEFINITION 2. A vector x* E X is said to be an equilibrium of a 
generalized game (an abstract economy) if Vie I 
(i) x.7 E Fj(xTi) and 
(ii) XT maximizes u~(x*,, xi) over F,(x*,). 
If Fj(xei) = Xi, Vie Z, th e generalized game reduces to the conventional 
game and the equilibrium is called a Nash equilibrium. 
Debreu [8] proved that, for a finite number of players and the 
Euclidean space, an equilibrium of the generalized game exists if (i) X, is 
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a contractible polyhedron; (ii) F, is closed; (iii) ui is continuous such that 
the function 
s -I ~max{u,(x~,,x,):.u;EF,(x~,)} 
is continuous; (iv ) the set 
M(x [) = {x+F,(xJ: ui(xm,, x,)>ui(x~m,, z,), Vzi~ F;(s ,)} 
is contractible. Since then this classical result has been extended in many 
ways. Shafer and Sonnenschein [20] and Borglin and Keiding [6] 
extended Debreu’s result to the generalized games with the finite dimen- 
sional strategy space and the finitely many agents and without ordered 
preferences. For the infinite dimensional strategy space and finitely or 
infinitely many agents case, the existence results were given by Yannelis 
and Prabhakar [27], Khan and Vohra [14], Toussaint [24], Khan and 
Papageorgiou [lS], Kim, Prikry, and Yannelis [16], Khan [ 131, 
Yannelis [26], Tian [22], and others. In this paper we apply our Theorem 1 
to prove an existence theorem of equilibrium in the generalized game where 
the payoff (utility) functions U, and the feasible strategy correspondences F, 
are not 1.s.c. 
THEOREM 2. For i E I, let X, he a nonempty convex compact subset of a 
locally convex topological vector space, X = ni, [X,, and X , = n jt, :,I X,. 
Zffor each iE I, x = (xpi, x,), 
0) ui: X -+ R is quasiconcave in x, and U.S.C. in x; 
(ii) F,: Xp,-+2x1 is U.S.C. and nonempty convex compact-valued 
correspondence; 
(iii) ui is FPT1.s.c. in x, w.r.t. F,, 
then there exists an equilibrium in the generalized game. 
Proof: For each i E Z, define the maximizing correspondence 
Mi(xp,) = (X,E Fi(xpi): ui(xm I> x,)3u,(x-j, z,), Vz,~F,k,)}. 
The correspondence M, : Xpi + 2 X1 is nonempty convex-valued, because U, 
is U.S.C. in x and concave in xi and F, (x-,) is nonempty convex compact- 
valued. For these ui, Fi, and Mj, Theorem 1 guarantees that Mi is U.S.C. 
and compact-valued. Therefore the correspondence 
M(x)= n M;(xm,) 
it?, 
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is U.S.C. by Lemma 3 in Fan [ 10, p. 1241 and nonempty convex compact- 
valued from X+ 2? So, by Theorem 1 in Fan [ 10, p. 1221, there exists 
x* E X such that x* E M(x*) and x* is an equilibrium in the generalized 
game. Q.E.D. 
5. THE EXISTENCE OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM 
When the feasible strategy correspondence F, is constant set-valued, the 
generalized game reduces to the conventional game. Nash [IS] proved that 
a (Nash) equilibrium of the game exists if each Xi c IwL’ is compact, convex, 
and nonempty, and if ui is continuous on X and quasiconcave in x’. 
Dasgupta and Maskin [7] extended Nash’s resuls to games with discon- 
tinuous payoff functions. They proved that an equilibrium of the game 
exists if each Z’C [w’+ is compact, convex, and nonempty, and if the 
u’(x’, x-‘) is quasiconcave in x’, upper semicontinuous in x, and graph- 
continuous3. When the feasible strategy correspondence F, is constant 
set-valued, every path is feasible. The FPT 1.s.c. can be restated as 
DEFINITION 3. A function u(e, y): E x Y -+ R is said to be Path Transjkr 
Lower Semicontinuous in e (in short, PF 1.s.c.) if for each (e, y) E E x Y there 
exists an X(e) of e such that Ve’ E ,V(e), 3~’ E Y satisfying 
u( e, y ) d lim inf u( e’, y’), 
e”c 
or, equivalently, for each (e, v) E E x Y and VIE >O, U”(e) such that 
Ve’ E %_ V(e), 3~’ E Y satisfying 
u(e, y) -c u(e’, y’) + E. 
As a special case of Proposition 1, we have 
PROPOSITION 3. Let E and Y be two topological spaces, u: E x Y -+ R be 
a real-valued function. Then the marginal (or performance, value) function $ : 
E -+ R defined, for each e E E, as 
Il/(e)=sw{u(e,y):yE Y) 
is 1.s.c. if and only if u(e, y) is PT 1,s.~. in e. 
3 Dasgupta and Maskin [7] defined a payoff function to be graph-continuous if for all X E X 
there exists a function F, : X-, + X, with F, (X -,) = 2, such that u, (F, (x -,), x ,) is continuous 
at x-,=X-,. 
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Remark 2. Observe that a payoff function u is clearly PT 1s.~. if it is 
graph-continuous. The following theorem generalizes Theorem 2 of 
Dasgupta and Maskin [7] by relaxing the graph-continuity. 
THEOREM 3. For iE I, let X, be a nonempty convex compact set of a 
locally convex topological vector space, X= njE, X,, and X-, = Hi,, {,I X,. 
If for each ie I, x = (x I, x,), u,: X-+ iw is quasiconcave in xi and U.S.C. in x 
and PT 1.s.c. in xi then there exists a Nash equilibrium. 
ProoJ: For each ieN and each x-,~X-i, let Fi(X~-i)zXi and apply 
Theorem 2. Q.E.D. 
The PT 1.s.c. is, in fact, weaker than graph-continuity. To see this let us 
consider the following example. 
EXAMPLE 1. Consider a function f(x, y) defined on the square 
Z= [0, l] x [0, 11 by 
if x=y 
if y=O,x#O 
otherwise. 
(5) 
It can be shown that f(x, y) is u.s.c., quasiconcave in x, and PT 1.s.c. in x. 
But it is not graph continuous in x. For any (x, y) E Z and any x’ +x, we 
just choose y’ = x’, a path along the diagonal. Then 
f(x, y) < lim inff(x’, y’). 
x’ - .x 
Thus f(x, y) is PT 1.s.c. in x. While at each given (x, y) with y = 0 and 
x # 0, and any y’ # y we have f(x, y) = l/2 and f(x’, y’) = either 0 (x’ # y’) 
or 1 (x’ = y’). Therefore f(x, y) is not graph continuous at (x, y). 
As a matter of fact, for any topological vector space X, any f(x, y) 
defined on Z = Xx X satisfying 
(6) 
is PT 1.s.c. in x. 
As a final remark, compactness of strategy spaces of the (generalized) 
games can be relaxed by using the similar techniques in Baye, Tian, and 
Zhou [2], Tian [22,23]. 
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